Patterns of Industrial Change in the Federal Republic of Germany.  Part I: Flows of Manufacturing Output and Energy Input by Doblin, C.P.
Patterns of Industrial Change in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Part 
I: Flows of Manufacturing Output 
and Energy Input
Doblin, C.P.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-84-073
September 1984 
Doblin, C.P. (1984) Patterns of Industrial Change in the Federal Republic of Germany. Part I: Flows of Manufacturing Output 
and Energy Input. IIASA Working Paper. WP-84-073 Copyright © 1984 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/2445/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
PA'ITEXNS OF INDUSI'RIAL CHANGE IN THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Part 1: Rows of Manufacturing Output 
and Ehergy lnput 
Claire P. Doblin 
September 1984 
WP-84-73 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and have received only 
limited review. Views or  opinions expressed herein do not 
necessarily represent those of the  Institute or  of its National 
Member Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
The work on patterns of industrial change in the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many is one of a series of case studies that are underway as part of IIASA's 
research into economic structural change and growth. A summary of the first 
case study, which relates to the United States, was distributed in 1983.. 
The FRG Case Study consists of two parts. Part 1, which is reported here, 
deals with the major trends in structural change observed for the growth of 
capital stock and the flows of output and energy demand within the manufac- 
turing sector of the F R G  since 1950. This part was prepared by Claire Doblin. In 
Part 11, Michael Kraus has undertaken an empirical analysis of the energy 
intensities of the manufacturing sector in the FRG over the same period, in 
which he attempts to separate the effects of structural change and technical 
progress in decreasing the demand for energy a t  both the sectoral and the 
industry level. 
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PATI'ERNS OF INDUSl'RIAL CHANGE M THE 
F'EDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Part I: Row of Manufacturing Output 
and Energy Input 
Claire P. Doblin 
1. SUMMARY AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
1.1. Growth of Capital Stock Output. and Energy Input in the 
Manufacturing Sector as a Whole 
During the period of economic prosperity ushered in by the  reconstruction 
and development of the  FRG following World War 11, the  value of manufacturing 
capital stock. measured in constant 1970 prices, expanded a t  an average annual 
rate  of 7.8% in the  1950s (which was perhaps not a normal period) and 6.9% in 
the 1960s. The growth of total manufacturing output was unusually high during 
the 1950s (with an average annual ra te  of 10.3%) and continued a t  a somewhat 
reduced, but still high level during the  1960s (5.5% per annum) (see Table 1). 
The prime movers behind this  development were the  expansion of infrastruc- 
ture and the growth of the  chemical, automobile, and electric and electronic 
equipment industries. The electric equipment industry is traditionally heavily 
dependent on innovation, and the application of new technologies; much the 
same applies t o  a number of chemical goods, such as synthetic fibers, drugs, 
and pharmaceuticals. 
In the  1970s, manufacturing capital stock grew a t  an average annual rate 
of no more than 3.3%. while the growth rate for total manufacturing dwindled to 
an annual average of only 1.8%; this was followed by cutbacks and stagnation of 
output through 1983, with some recovery expected in 1984. Figure 1 shows the 
growth of capital stock, output, and final energy demand for the  manufacturing 
sector since 1950, expressed as indexes based on 1970 = 100. The slow growth 
of capital stock is also reflected in the  general slowdown in annual investment 
and gross fixed capital formation (CFCF) in the  manufacturing and other sec- 
tors of the economy. I t  stands to  reason that  these developments in invest- 
ment  are closely related t o  the  growth of those basic industries, e.g. iron and 
steel, or  stone, clay, and sand (including cement), that are both capital and 
energy intensive. Consequently, the  slowdown in investment in the  F'RC has 
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Table 1. Summary economic indicators of growth in the FRG, 1950-03. 
Year Total economp. 
~ G Q I  dxed capital formation 
Total Public sector 
construction 
Hanufacturing sector 
Capital Output Final energy 
rtock (value input 
added) (quantity ) 
1. bdot hiumbers 1870 = 100 
1850 24.0 
1851 25.3 
1652 27.5 
1- 52.1 
1834 98.2 
1956 43.7 
1858 47.5 
1857 47.5 
1856 49.4 
1638 55.3 
1880 64.2 45.7 
1881 68.6 50.0 
1882 71.4 58.0 
1889 72.3 67.6 
1884 80.4 82.0 
1885 04.3 03.3 
1888 85.9 84.2 
1867 78.4 76.8 
1068 82.3 82.1 
1980 81 .O 89.0 
1870 100.0 100.0 
1871 106.2 98.0 
1872 100.0 B6.0 
1879 100.6 N.0 
1874 86.2 100.0 
1875 93.4 88.0 
1878 87.7 85.0 
1W 101.5 01.0 
1878 106.4 W.0 
1878 114.1 88.0 
lee0 117.8 88.2 
1901 112.9 80.6 
1882 107.2 82.5 
1883 110.3 75.0 
d Msoluk valuas d ~BiTOprices (18 DM) 
24.0 21 .0 10.5 
25.5 28.4 47.2 
a. 1 28.3 51.3 
20.0 90.5 50.2 
90.0 34.0 54.3 
93.6 40.8 61.3 
36.0 44.2 65.0 
10. 2 46.1 65.3 
43.4 47.5 69.6 
46.0 51.6 65.5 
51.1 58.6 73.5 
58.0 82.3 74.3 
61.1 84.7 73.2 
65.0 66.0 76.7 
70.5 73.0 82.4 
73.5 77.4 84.6 
80.6 78.2 82.1 
115.2 76.1 81.0 
89.2 83.3 88.8 
83.0 84.2 85.5 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
106.4 101.6 87.4 
112.2 105.4 88.8 
117.2 112.5 104.4 
121.6 108.0 105.4 
125.2 102.8 82.7 
1 28.2 108.4 BB.0 
130.3 111.8 87.4 
132.6 113.1 87.0 
194.0 118.8 100.4 
137.7 110.0 87.6 
116.4 81.0 
112.0 83.0 
113.5 85.0 
loe TCE 
1880 202.7 20.7 
1881 194.2 28.2 
1882 184.4 29.8 
1QB3 180.7 21.9 
575.7 370.1 09.7 
362.9 84.1 
%I .6: 
353.0 EpE 
3. Awruge annual p u i U r  nates (XI  
1850-1060 10.3 
1860-1WO 4.5 8.145 
1070-1880 1 .a5 -0.00 
1880-1883 -2.1 68 -8.54 
7.85 10.54 6.1 
6.96 5.40 3.12 
3.25 1.755 -0.064 
-1.565 -4.503 
E = edrnate; PE = preliminq edimab.  
Sourcer and Note.: 
htd (;tors h d  w d  hmrolion (CPCP) (Anlugeinvestitionon) for the economy ar a whole include8 equipment 
m d  conmtruction by private actor m d  government. 
Data for CFCF total md puhlic actor construction 1080 to 1081 are compiled from Satistuches h o m t .  
k M r h q l l L i c h r  b.omtrsc)mungm 1860-1981, op. cil. pp. 57 and 59. 
Data b r  lK3l to 1983 wrc cornmudcat4 orally by the Satidischon hnd~mml.  12 July 1084 (Data converted 
from 1978 to 1470 pice#). 
Data b r  1930 to lWIO were complled from C. Doidin. CaNtal Porntion. Capital bock and Capltal Output RaUor 
1950-1975. I U S A  Rraearch Hernoran&um RH-7B70; December 1978. 
Hu~ufacturlng -tor capltrl .Lock. output and energy input. r e  Tabla 7. 10. m d  1 1 .  
1-1 nu-. 
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Rgure 1. FRG Total Manufacturing. The Growth of Capital Stock, Output and 
Fmal Energy Input since 1950. Index Numbers, 1970 = 100. 
l5gure 2. FRG The Growth of the Total Economy's Gross Fixed Capital Forrna- 
tion. Total and Public Sector Construction; and the Manufacturing Sector's 
Demand for Final Energy Input since 1950. 
largely aflected the  growth of energy-intensive industries and hence the total 
demand for  final energy by the  manufacturing sector. One strong reason for 
the  drying-up of investment in the late  1960s and early 1970s was tha t  by tha t  
t ime the  country's need for infrastructure expansion had become saturated. A 
stage was reached when major construction projects designed to extend net- 
works of communications and transportation (such as roads, bridges, tunnels, 
underground railways, etc.) largely gave way to maintenance and repair work 
The close links between the  rise and fall of public sector investment in con- 
struction and the  energy demand of the  manufacturing sector can be seen from 
Figure 2. 
The slowdown in investment imposed an additional constraint on the  
growth of basic producer and investment goods, e.g. iron and steel and other  
primary metals (excluding aluminum), stone, sand, and clay (including 
cement),  and also the construction of certain nonelectrical machinery. For a 
number of reasons, such as the transition to  more lightweight materials, these 
energy-intensive industries had already embarked on a long-term. relative 
decline. The growth of these industries in absolute terms was soon eclipsed by 
the  expansion of industries less demanding in energy and yielding a higher pro- 
portion of value added. This trend was already apparent in the structural 
changes of industry after 1950, and became especially marked from the 1960s 
onward. In the  1970s and early 1900s, the  slower than average growth of the  
basic producer- and investment-goods industries turned into no growth and the  
outputs of some of the industries (e-g. steel and basic chemicals) that  a re  most 
energy intensive, actually fell in t e rms  of absolute physical quantities. 
The analysis of the structural changes of manufacturing in the F'RG shows 
tha t  there has been a long-term trend for t h e  energy input per unit of output of 
the  manufacturing sector as a whole to  decrease. Progressive improvements in 
energy productivity, during periods of generally decreasing energy prices, were 
mainly due to two factors. Machinery and equipment embodying better tech- 
nologies and with higher efficiency of fuel utilization routinely came on stream 
through either the  normal replacement of retired equipment or  the  expansion 
of production facilities. During the  recession years of the  1970s and early 
IBBOs, overall energy productivity was further  enhanced by disinvestment, or 
the  shutdown of older equipment tha t  was less efficient in fuel utilization. 
Throughout the entire period studied, starting with the 1950s, the  efficiency of 
fuel utilization was progressively improved by interfuel substitution, the  dis- 
placement of coal by oil and natural gas, and the increasing use of electricity. 
The confluence in the late 1960s and early 1970s of the three trends 
described above, namely the slowdom of infrastructure investment, the  contin- 
ued displacement of basic, energy-intensive industries, and the  long-term trend 
toward energy saving in manufacturing, explains in large measure the widening 
of the gap between energy input and manufacturing output in the FRG (see also 
Figure 1). Thus, the recessions brought on by the oil price shocks of the 1970s 
seem merely t o  have accelerated, rather  than caused, the process known as the  
"breaking of t h e  energy coefficient" (i.e. the  observation that total primary 
energy demand and GDP no longer follow the  same growth rates, as  they did 
over a long period from the end of World War I1 until the first oil price shock of 
1973). 
1.2. Major Trends Within the Manufacturing Sector 
The analysis concentrated on the patterns of structural change within the 
manufacturing sector of the  F'RG since the 1950s. For this purpose, the sector 
was disaggregated into 20 groups tha t  roughly correspond to  the  groupings a t  
the  2-digit level of the US Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). In order t o  
broaden the analysis, we supplemented the 20 groups with 60 indexes of gross 
and ne t  production and with data on physical quantities for selected industries. 
The index of production for the  manufacturing sector as a whole indicates 
what may be considered as national average growth. Deviations from this aver- 
age indicate whether an industry is fast growing or slow growing. The 
differences in growth behavior are also reflected in the structure of the percen- 
tage shares of the  various industries in total manufacturing over a period of 
time. Depending on whether their percentage shares in total manufacturing 
have been consistently rising or falling since 1950 or only since the 1970s, the 
industries were grouped into three  categories: slow-growth industries, fast- 
growth industries, and former fast-growth industries. 
The slow-growth category, which also includes the  no-growth industries, 
saw its share in total manufacturing output decrease from 43% in 1950 and 35% 
in 1960 to 29% in 1980. The most prominent "losers" were the  iron and steel 
industry, foundries and castings, other primary metals (except aluminum). and 
constructional steel. To some extent, the  relative decrease in the  share of 
these industries was due to  the  displacement of heavier materials by those of 
lighter weight. In t h e  case of steel, for example, this meant  the  use of more 
concrete in highway bridges, more plastic in cars,  and less steel in the 
manufacture of refrigerators, washing machines. and beer and other cans. 
Major users of steel and other heavy metals such as nonelectrical machinery 
and  construction have themselves become slow-growth industries, while some 
steel-using activities have ceased to  grow a t  all, such as shipbuilding, or  gone 
out  of style, as  for instance railroads. 
One very strong reason for the  decline of the primary metals (except 
aluminum) as well a s  the  stone, sand, and clay group (including cement) was 
tha t  the  demand for investment goods became depressed as the requirements 
for infrastructure building receded. This was true not only for the F'RG, but  for 
other  industrialized countries, such as the United States, as well. 
Besides the investment-goods industries mentioned above, there were 
o ther  relative losers as  the  structure of industry in the  F'RG changed. for a 
variety of reasons. These included the  lumber and sawmill industry (including 
pulp and raw paper), some of whose products may have been displaced by 
imports, the textiles industry, whose secular decline has long been a feature of 
other  developed economies, and the  food industry (including beverages and 
tobacco). The growth of food production usually lags behind growing prosperity, 
as i t  did in the  FRG until t he  recession of the  1980s, when the  sector regained 
some of its former relative importance. Finally, there are a number of miscel- 
laneous consumer goods, excluding food, whose development was stunted to  
some extent  by the inroads of foreign products into the  domestic market  
(clothing, gloves. shoes) and/or the competition of foreign producers on the  
world market  (optical and precision instruments, clocks and watches, toys, 
etc.). 
The fast-growth industries increased their share in total output from 
15.56% in 1950 to  31:64% in 1980. This group comprises the electric and elec- 
tronic equipment industry; i t s  share in the  total manufacturing output of the  
FRG increased from 6.53 to  14.35% over the same period. For the  energy 
requirements analysis, this industry had to  be lumped together with optical and 
precision instruments; this combination is not very helpful because of the  
opposing growth trends of the two industries. Thus, electric and electronic 
equipment manufacture taken alone would have followed an even higher growth 
path. However, not all branches of the electric and electronic equipment 
industry experienced the same degree of growth. For instance, during the 
1970s. the  manufacture of cables and other infrastructural elements connected 
with electric equipment experienced relative and sometimes even absolute 
declines. This clearly indicates the connection that  exists with the construc- 
tion industries. A decline was also observed for certain household appliances. 
such as washing machines and refrigerators, whose markets had become almost 
sa tura ted  But the regression of these industries was more than compensated 
by the spectacular expansion of the growth industries par ezcellence that  
embody the  application of new technologies, such as the manufacture of com- 
puters and other electronic equipment. 
The chemicals and allied industry increased its share in total manufactur- 
ing output from 6.68% in 1950 to 12.44% in 1980. The chemicals group includes 
a variety of industries, associated with three types of product: some of these 
are primary or basic materials such as inorganic and organic chemicals; others 
are intermediate products like fertilizers, dyestuffs, and synthetic fibers; and 
others again are final consumer goods such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, 
paints. etc. Each of these groups differs in its energy requirements and poten- 
tial for value added, with energy demand decreasing and value added increasing 
as we move from basic materials to 6nal consumer goods. 
Based on the FRG's census-type periodical 7?u %mey of Employment ,  
h o v e r ,  and Energy Consumpti.on, i t  is estimated that  13.3% of the h a l  
energy demand of the entire manufacturing sector in 1980 was absorbed by 
basic and intermediate chemicals. Bearing in mind that  the quantitative out- 
put of a significant group of basic chemicals. including synthetic ammonia. 
methanol, and phosphate fertilizers, had ceased to grow by the early 1970s and 
even decreased in the late 1970s and early 1980s, i t  is estimated that  the slow 
and a t  times negative growth of the energy-intensive basic and intermediate 
chemicals industry as a whole played a major role in the "breaking of the 
energy coefficient." 
The growth in the chemical industry's production of final consumer goods 
was  echoed in the expansion of another fast-growth industry, namely the  pro- 
cessing of plastic and synthetic goods, whose share in total manufacturing out- 
put increased from 0.22% in 1950 to 2.81% in 1990. This development was 
undoubtedly due to innovation. The same seems to have been true for the 
recent rapid growth of the fine ceramics group, which manufactures some of 
the components for the computer industry. Fine ceramics (which also includes 
glass production and processing) was a slow-growth industry in the  earlier 
decades, when its share in total output fell from 2.31% in 1950 to 1.31% in 1970, 
but subsequently its share advanced to 2.29% by 1980. 
In contrast to former slow-growth industries that later became fast-growth, 
there are a few former fast-growth industries that seemed to lose their mornen- 
tum for expansion under the impact of the oil price explosions of the  1970s. 
These are  mineral oil refining. rubber. and asbestos (including automobile 
tires), and possibly the vehicles industry (including automobiles). The com- 
bined share of these groups in total manufacturing output rose from 5.68% in 
1950 to 13.62% in 1970; but by 1980 the  share of these industries was no higher 
than 13.709.. 
The flrst and second oil price explosions had some impact on the produc- 
tion of distillate fuel oil; 1980 output, after a few oscillations during the 
preceding decade, was only 8% above the 1970 figure. More direct and serious 
was the  impact on residual fuels production; this fell continuously after 1974, 
so tha t  by 1980 i t  was nearly 40% below the 1970 Q u r e .  More recent  data are so 
far unavailable for distillate a n d  residual fuels. In any case their development 
sharply contrasts with that  of gasoline - where 1980 output was still 55% above 
the 1970 level, followed by a minor dip in 1981, recovery in 1982, and stagnation 
in 1983. At the same time, t i re  production for automobiles in 1980 was no 
higher than in 1970; i t  subsequently dropped to below the 1970 figure in 1983. 
The impact of the  oil price explosion on automobile production is not yet 
completely clear. In the  1950s and 1960s this industry expanded at about the  
same, high ra te  as total chemicals and the production of electric and elec- 
tronic equipment. The la t te r  industries continued on essentially t h e  same 
growth path throughout the  1970s with only a minor disturbance in 1975 - 
thanks mostly to  the growth of pharmaceuticals and other chemical consumer 
goods, and the  revolution in the  computer industry. However, automobile pro- 
duction grew only very little in the early 1970s, and in the recession years i t  
fell to a level t h a t  was slightly below that  of 1970. But since the slump of 1975 
output has somewhat recovered By 1983 the ne t  production index (1970 = 100) 
for vehicles serving as investment goods had climbed to 136.9, while the  gross 
production index (1970 = 100) for private-use vehicles stood a t  121.5. 
What is really in store for FRC automobile production - if t he  approaching 
saturation of the  domestic market  should happen to  coincide with growing con- 
s traints  on exports - only t ime will tell. 
2. MANUFACTURING OUTPUT 
2.1. Method and Sources 
The case study on the pat terns of industrial change in the Federal Republic 
of Germany concentrates on t h e  manufacturing sector (Vermbeitendes 
Gewerbe). In 1980, manufacturing accounted for nearly 77% of gross value 
added produced by the industry sector; a further 15% came from construction, 
6% from the utilities (electricity, gas, water), and only 2% from mining. Over 
the  last two decades, both utilities and construction gained slightly, while the  
already low share of mining dropped continuously from 5% in 1960 t o  only 2% in 
1980 (see Table 2). 
2.1.1. Slec t ion  01 Output indicators 
The analysis of s tructural  changes in the flows of manufacturing output is 
mainly based on the ne t  production volume, a concept used by the  Deutsches 
Institut fGr Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW). This is only one of the  many output 
measures with which the German statistical l i terature abounds. For a com- 
parison of various concepts and  definitions of output see Table 3, which shows 
the values of output a t  cur rent  prices for total manufacturing in 1970 and 1980. 
I t  can be seen that  net production volume is somewhat higher than, but still 
close to  gross value added Ln fact, when the  DIW prepared its Net h l u m e  of 
Production series, it used t h e  gross value added for a group of 20 manufactur- 
ing industries. Therefore, in the  following analysis, the  terms n e t  production 
volume and gross value added a r e  used interchangeably. 
Here the question arises a s  to whether the  analysis should have been based 
on value added instead of gross value ojproduction. In this connection, i t  may 
be recalled tha t  the Arst IIASA case study of structural changes, which 
Table 2. The structure of the industrial sector of the FRG (gross value added in 
current  prices), 1960, 1970, and 1980. 
h I if DM (current p i c e s )  
Mining 8360 8220 13400 
Utilities 7290 14500 37860 
Construction 23290 51550 99030 
h percent 
Manufacturing 12 1860 259450 490170 ( 75.8 77.8 76.6 
Total industry 160800 333720 640460 1 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total CDP 611520 , 958600 1261800 1 
Source: Compiled from Stcrtistisches G1Lndescunt Volkswirtschqftliche Gesamt- 
technungen; Bmidierte h e  bnisse 1960- 198 1. 
Fbcherie 18 Re* S 5 page 142-143. 
concerned the United States, was based on gross value 01 production.* The 
preference for gross production is based on the fact that differences in factor 
cost could distort the flndings of the  analysis of structural changes. It  is 
undoubtedly true that  the price of input materials, profits, and labor costs vary 
considerably between industries and products. This can be seen in the 
input-output analysis that has been carried out, e.g. for the United States, for 
close to 450 products.  However, for input-output analysis it is also a question 
of the absolute values for selected years. But the FRG study of annual changes 
over a long-term period of the f l o w s  of industries attempts to measure the rela- 
tive growth rather than the actual output levels of industries, and this a t  a 
fairly high level of aggregation. A t  this level it seems that differences in factor 
cost do not significantly affect the long-term growth trends of the various 
industries, whether measured in terms of gross or net production. This may be 
observed in the  indexes of gross and net  production compiled by the F'RG sta- 
tistical offices for investment goods and consumer goods, shown in Table 4. 
The indexes reported in Table 4 show that the growth trends for gross pro- 
duction (turnover excluding sales taxes) and net production (gross value added) 
have been quite similar in the  FRG in the past decade. This means that the 
share of intermediate input has remained stable for most of the period, except 
for some significant changes during the years of recession; these latter 
changes may have been due to inventory accounting or imports. 
Further comparisons may be found in the computer printouts a t  the end of 
this paper. which show gross and net  production a t  current and constant prices 
and the implicit price deflators for selected manufacturing industries, all for 
the  period 1950-1980. Here i t  should be noted that both gross and net produc- 
tion figures are  not always available for ell industries; moreover. a gross pro- 
duction index has obviously not been compiled for total manufacturing, so as to 
avoid double counting. 
W a i r e  P .  k b h ,  ?+&ems of bd=tTLd h g a  in ths VSA Since 1W0: A h l i m i ~ r y  Sunmaq. 
Vorkng  P a p r  UP-89-103. kenburg,  A w t r i a :  International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. 
Table 3. The structure of the industrial sector of the FRC (gross production, gross and net  value added, and net  produc- 
tion volume all in 10' DM current prices), 1970 and 1980. 
production net  produc- production production value added net  produc- 
Gross Net tion volume volume tion volume 
1970 
Gross Value added (COP) Effective Net 
Mining 15440 8220 6920 1 30433 13400 8g87 
1980 
Cross Cross Efl ec tive 
Utilities (electricity, 
gas, water) 31410 14500 10330 
Construction 95880 51550 47640 1 .  99030 
a Verarbaitendes Gewerbe. 
Rodutisrdencles Cewerbe. 
Sources: 
Gross Production (Brutto A.oduktConsweri) excluding Sales and Value Added Tax, and adjusted for movement of stocks, see: Statis- 
tisches Bundesamt. Statistisches JaJwbuch 1983, p. 530 Table 23.4 and VoLkswi7tschuflliche Cesamtrechungen; revcdierte Bgeb-  
nisse 1860-1 881. Fmhserie 18. hihe S5, p. 152-153. 
Cross Value Added (Cross Production minus cost of materials used and commission work) see: Statistisches Jcrhrbuch 1983, p. 530, 
Table 23.4. 
Net Value Added (Gross Value Added minus overhead, amortization, indirect (production) taxes, see source for gross value added. 
Effective Net Production Volume. see: Deutsches Institut ftir Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Statistkche Kennziffem 1970 lB8O Berlin, 
October 1981; p. 5. 
Net Productiori Volume. Data compiled by DIW for Mlchael Kraue. 
Table 4. Comparison of production indexes in the  FRC, 1970-81; index 
numbers, 1970 = 100. 
Year Production index for 
h v e s  tment goods Consumer goods 
GrossE Ne tb Grossa Netb 
- - 
8 Gmss production denotes turnover excludirq sales taxes, adjusted for movement of 
stocks. 
Net production denotes gross production excluding the value of materials used; this is 
similar to the German gross value added. 
We also examined in various ways the breakdown of 1970 production by 
individual industries. At a fairly disaggregated level the net volume of produc- 
tion is higher than the corresponding gross and net value added; the exceptions 
here are those industries that are subject to substantial taxes on production, 
such as alcohol and tobacco, and particularly mineral oil refining, where net 
value added is appreciably lower than either gross or  net volume of production. 
We also checked which specific industries were included in each of the 20 
groups used for the classification of manufacturing output, energy input, and 
capital. The 20 groups were based on the German Standard Classification of 
Industries (SYPRO); they bear a considerable resemblance to the US Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) a t  the 2-digit level (although there are some 
differences in the level of detail that could be compensated for). 
For 1980 i t  is not easy to compare net production volume with other meas- 
ures of production, because the net production volume is available only a t  1970 
prices. Here it may be recalled that the rea l  (constant price) net production 
volume was compiled for both total manufacturing and f o r  individual industries 
from 1970 values a t  current  prices, extrapolated back to 1960 and forward to 
1980 with the  help of the index of net production (Nettoproduktionsindez). This 
is an index designed to  measure quantitative output changes, and is somewhat 
similar to the  US Federal Reserve Board (FRB) index. Hence current price 
values and price deflators are not available in the source material from which 
the net production volume was compiled. 
Data on manufacturing output in terms of net  production volume were 
readily available on computer tapes; for the analysis of energy coefficients this 
material was prepared by the German statistical agencies, as described in Part 
I1 of this report by Michael Kraus. For this reason, the  net volume ofproduction 
is recommended for the  preliminary analysis of structural changes-of industry, 
with the proviso that  a few of the manufacturing groups need first to be disag- 
gregated. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of repeating the 
exercise with gross production values a t  some future date. 
A subsequent repetition of the analysis based on gross production values 
would be desirable for a number of reasons: 
1. Compilation of capital/output ratios; 
2. Utilization of a higher level of disaggregation, involving 31 or more SYPRO 
groups instead of 20; 
3. Possibility of updating the analysis; 
4. Improved comparability with the previous US study, which was based on 
sales values (gross- production). 
2.2. Changes in the Growth and Structure of Output Rows 
2.2.1. lhe Growth oj  7btal Manujacturing A i c e s  and Output 
Reconstruction after World War Il ushered in a period of unprecedented 
growth for the German economy. Up until 1973, this was generally a period 
when production rose faster than prices, while the opposite held true after the 
first oil price shock and during the rampant inflation it engendered. Table 5 
shows the GDP deflator and GDP a t  constant prices, as well as the total 
manufacturing sector output and producer price index since 1950. I t  can be 
seen that  there was considerable agreement between the GDP deflator and the 
producer price index for total manufacturing during the 1970s. probably 
because, in times of high inflation, the  data may become biased a t  a high level 
of aggregation. However, the  producer prices for individual manufacturing 
industries at no time followed the same growth path; some dropped or stag- 
nated. while others rose (for details see Table 6). Thus, in the pre-1973 period. 
producer prices for both mineral oil refining and the chemical industry us a 
whole came down while most other producer prices went up, albeit slowly. 
During the 1970s and through the early 1980s crude oil led the price race. 
The index of the producer price for the mineral oil refining industries (based on 
1970 = 100) shot up to 363.1 in 1982, before falling slightly to 351.6 in 1983. 
Analysis of the producer prices charged by other major industries shows t h a t  
none of them matched this rate of growth. In fact, those industries tha t  
require a very high energy input saw their producer prices (not adjusted for 
inflation) dropping or stagnating in the period between the two oil shocks. 
Examples include iron and steel, nonferrous metals, and chemicals. Some of 
the decreases or stagnation in prices can be attributed to the strength of the 
D-Mark relative to  the weak U S  Dollar used to purchase oil on the  world market 
in the 1970s. Other industries with relatively low energy inputs experienced 
the highest price increases, such as the  nonelectrical machinery group (where 
output grew relatively slowly) and the leather and shoe industry (where produc- 
tion actually decreased, in part because of foreign competition). On the  other 
hand, producer prices for electrotechnical~products, which also have a modest 
energy input. increased only slightly, while the producer price indexes for the 
group including office machinery, electronic equipment, and data processing 
actually declined from 1970 (100) to 1982 (87.6), followed by stagnation in 1983 
(87.1). No separate producer price indexes are available on this group for the 
pre-1970 period. 
2.2.2. lhe Presentation oj Sh.ucturd Chahge 
The output of the FRG manufacturing sector as a whole shows much the  
same growth whether measured in terms of gross production values, gross 
value added, or the net production index, as can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5. Developments in the  CDP and the manufacturing sector of the FRG, 
1950-83; the growth of prices and production; index numbers, 1970 = 100. 
Year CDP 
Deflators Cross value 
added 
(constant 
prices) 
1950 52.3 29.3 
1960 70.1 62.0 
Manufacturing Sector 
Producer Net Net Gross 
prices production production production 
index volume values 
Sources: 
GDP (Brutto Inlands Produkt) in constant prices and deflator compiled from Sutis- 
tisches Bndesamt m e  Reihen 1982 p. 2C2; updated with RWschqft und Satistik, Feb. 
1984 Statismhe Nachrichten. 
Producer prices see Table 4. 
Net production volume see Table 5. 
Net production index (Netto Produktions Index) see Table 6. 
Gross production value (Brutto Produktions Wert) see Table 2. 
For obvious reasons, growth was strongest in the  1950s with output rising 
continuously from a ra the r  low base. At the very beginning of the period, out- 
put a t  constant prices measured in terms of the  net  volume of production 
increased by over 20% from 1950 to 1951. For the ent ire  decade, the average 
annual growth ra te  (net  volume of production) was 10.5%. In the 1960s, the 
average annual growth r a t e  was still fairly strong a t  5.5X, though markedly less 
than in the 1950s; production stagnated somewhat in 1966, followed by a small 
drop in 1967. 
In the 1970s. the average annual growth rate slowed to 1.76%. The 1974/75 
recession that followed the  first oil price shock in November 1973 cut deeper 
than the 1966/67 se tback However, the recession was quickly overcome, giving 
Table 8. The growth of producer prices in the FRC. 1950-83; index numbers. 1970 = 100. 
I 
1960 1960 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
bbsfc m u t e t i d s  
Petr. reflnery product8 78.4 100.2 100.0 109.5 106.6 129.8 181.9 181.5 194.6 193.2 190.7 239.7 294.7 357.5 363.1 351.6 
Iron and steel 49.4 96.3 100.0 104.6 107.4 116.2 137.0 129.1 130.4 125.2 125.3 129.1 134.2 139.2 155.9 148.7 
Nonferrous metals 65.1 73.3 100.0 84.4 70.3 07.5 114.2 84.2 93.7 94.4 90.0 107.0 120.7 120.0 112.5 125.0 
Chemlcala 103.7 106.4 100.0 100.3 100.1 103.2 129.5 131.9 133.5 132.3 130.0 140.9 161.9 165.3 172.7 173.0 
huestment  goods 
Machinery. non- 
electrical 49.6 71.7 100.0 108.4 112.9 119.1 131.1 143.0 150.4 157.9 163.5 169.6 178.6 187.7 199.0 205.4 
Road vehicles 82.1 87.9 100.0 107.3 111.8 117.4 128.1 139.3 144.1 150.3 154.6 159.7 166.9 172.9 184.3 189.9 
Electrotechnical 
products 91.0 100.0 103.3 105.4 108.4 116.2 120.4 122.9 124.7 125.7 127.8 132.8 137.2 142.3 146.0 
OfFlce machinery. 
electronic ofRce 
equlprnent, data I 
procesalng . 100.0 09.3 95.9 93.6 95.6 99.5 98.9 98.1 91.4 85.8 84.2 84.8 87.6 87.1 F 
Consumer Coods 1 
Total, excl. food 84.6 84.9 100.0 103.7 107.4 115.4 128.9 132.5 136.4 140.4 142.7 149.7 160.8 168.7 175.3 178.5 
Leather and shoes 70.3 77.5 100.0 106.8 114.3 127.5 135.9 140.9 147.3 150.7 103.2 173.8 189.2 197.7 204.1 209.1 
Clothing 85.0 82.3 100.0 104.7 108.7 115.4 123.1 127.8 131.2 136.5 140.7 144.8 151.3 159.0 165.2 170.1 
Food, beverages, 
tobacco 86.3 89.2 100.0 103.7 107.7 116.8 123.4 128.1 133.0 142.2 141.0 141.5 144.9 151.6 160.5 164.0 
Sources: 
Producer Price Indices compiled from Long. h h n ,  op. cit. pp. 178, updated with MechaJT und S a t i s t i k .  February 1884, op. clt. and oral c o m m d -  
cations from FRC Sat ist ischos k?kn&sa?nt 7 May 1884. 
way to new growth that  lasted from 1976 to 1979, until the second oil price 
shock gave rise to a stagnation of output (1980), followed by cutbacks in 1981 
and 1982, stagnation in 1983, and an expected recovery in 1984. 
Hardly any of the individual manufacturing industries increased their out- 
put a t  the same rate as the manufacturing sector as a whole. The differences in 
growth between various industries are reflected in their percentage shares in 
total manufacturing output over a period of time. Likewise, growth differences 
are manifested through the indexes of production; the index for the manufac- 
turing sector as a whole may be considered as the national average, so that 
individual deviations from this average reflect the growth of individual indus- 
tries, in the same way as the changing percentage structure. 
Table 7 shows the percentage share structure a t  a broad level of aggrega- 
tion in 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980, taken from IIASA computer printouts of the 
n e t  v o l u m e  o ~ p 7 o d u c t i o n .  These data were ccmpiled for only 20 groups. In 
order to provide more detail, and to enable us to update the analysis through 
the early 1980s. we supplemented the indexes of the net  volume of production. 
starting with 1970, with nearly 60 more indexes representing net production 
(Akttoproduktionsindez), gross production (Bmttoproduktionsindez), or other 
measures of the physical quantities of production (see Tables 8 and 9). 
The industries shown in Tables 7 and 8 are grouped into three categories: 
slow growth, fast growth, and former fast growth. The grouping is based on 
year-by-year observations of whether the percentage shares in total manufac- 
turing output of each of the 20 SYPRO groups were continuously falling or con- 
tinuously rising since 1950 or  only since the 1970s. 
2.3. SLor-Growth and No-Growth Industries 
These are the groups whose growth has continuously lagged behind the 
national average for manufacturing as a whole. Their share in total output 
decreased from 43X in 1950 to 29% in 1980. These "underperformers" or 
"losers" include all of the basic, heavy industries, all the older industries using 
established technologies, as  well as a few others for which demand changed 
significantly during the period studied. 
2.3. I .  M e t d  A o d u c i n g  a n d  P m c e s s i n g  h d v s t r i e s  
The most prominent "losers" are  the metal producing and processing 
industries, from primary metals through to metal fabrications and the con- 
struction of nonelectrical machinery. The share of these seven SYPRO groups 
in total manufacturing eroded from 35% in 1950 to 257. in 1980. 
At first, the drop was only slight. During the 1950s when the growth of 
German industry was very strong, and with reconstruction still continuing in 
many sectors of the economy, the  t o t a l  share of the metal and metal processing 
industries did not change very much, namely from 35.38% in 1950 to 34.347. in 
1960. This small decrease can be mainly ascribed to iron and steel producing. 
ferrous foundries, and constructional steel (including shipbuilding and rolling 
stock). which started early on their relative decline, while nonferrous metals 
and nonelectrical machinery construction were still expanding their shares in 
total manufacturing output. 
However, after 1960, with the Wutschaftsurunder slowly petering out, 
almost all of the basic metal and metal processing industries started in earnest 
on a path of relative decline. Their combined share in total manufacturing out- 
put decreased from 34.34% in  1960 to 28.78% in 1970, and to 25.25% in 1980. 
Table 7. The changing structure of manufacturing output in the FRG, 1950-80; 
percentage shares calculated using constant 1970 prices. 
h d u s t r v  or sector 1950 1960 1970 1980 
1. S o w g r o w t h  industr ies 
Iron and steel production 
Steel foundries 
Steel drawing 
Non-ferrous metals 
(Subtotal) 
Constructional steel, shipbuilding 
Fabricated metal products, hardware 
Nonelectrical machinery construction 
(Subtotal) 
Stone, sand, clay (incl. cement) 
Lumber, sawmills 
Cellulose, pulp, raw paper, cardboard 
Tertiles, excl. clothing 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Misc. consumer goods 
(Subtotal) 
Total slow-growth industries 78.70 69.27 59.20 54.33 
2. F b t - g r o w t h  industries 
Electric, electronic equipment; 
optical, precision instruments 
Chemicals 
Synthetic and plastic goods 
F i e  ceramics, glass 
Total fast-growth industries 15.56 20.35 27.19 31.84 
3. firmer l a s t - g r o w t h  industr ies  
Mineral oil refining 1.12 2.38 3.95 3.61 
Rubber and asbestos goods 1.30 1.34 1.42 1.27 
Vehicles and repair, incl. 
automobiles. aircraft, 
and space ships 3.26 6.63 8.25 8.88 
Total former fast-growth industries 5.68 10.35 13.62 13.76 
Total manufacturing (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Total manufacturing (10' DM a t  1970 prices) 65.5 175.4 299.5 370.2 
Source: Net Volume of Production at 1970 prices for 20 SlPRO groups at 2-digit level 
compiled by Lkukches hstitut fir ~ r t s c h u ~ f o r s c h u n q  (Dm) See I IASA computer 
printouts for annual data. 
Table 8. The growth of individual manufacturing industries in the FRG, 
1 lndustry or sector 1950 1960 1970 1971 1972 1973 
1 
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58 
40 
41 
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47 
48 
50 
51 
st 
53 
56 
- 
1.Sm~gmwthindustries 
Iron and steel production 
Steel foundries 
Steel drawing 
Crude steel ingob index. IQ 
Non-ferrous metals 
Copper, refined, unwrought, IQ 
Aluminum, unwrought, primarg, IQ 
Constructional steel, shipbuilding 
Shipbuilding, NP 
bcomotives, IQ 
Fabricated metal products, hardware 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Nonelectrical machinery. BP 
Food processing, BP 
Agricultural machinery, BP 
Metalworking machinery, BP 
Textile machinery, sewing 
machinery, leather. shoes. BP 
Stone, aand. clay (incl. cement) 
Cement. IQ 
Lumber, sawmills 
Cellulose, pulp, raw paper, cardboard 
Paper, raw, IQ 
Textiles, excl. clothing 
Cotton woven fabrics, IQ 
Woollen waven fabrics, IQ 
Cellulose fiber woven fabrics, IQ 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Food, beverages. tobacco, NP 
Food,NP 
Tobacco processing, NP 
Beer, IQ 
Liquor, IQ 
Cigarettes, IQ 
Cigars, IQ 
Sugar. IQ 
Margarine, IQ 
Sausage and meats, IQ 
Fruit, canned. IQ 
h i t  juices. IQ 
Misc. consumer goods, 
excl. food 
Paper and cardboard goods, NP 
Printing, NP 
Leather producing, total. NP 
Leather goods excl. shoes. NP 
Shoes. BP 
Clothing, HP 
Woad processing incl. 
furniture, BP 
Furniture. BP 
Musical instruments, toys. 
jewellery, fountain pens, 
etc.. NP 
1950-83; index numbers, 1970 = 100. For footnotes see page 20. 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1 
Table 
58 
57 
58 
58 
60 
81 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
n 
79 
74 
75 
78 
m 
78 
70 
80 
111 
62 
83 
81 
I S  
88 
67 
88 
W 
90 
81 
82 
Q9 
@4 
85 
96 
87 
#I 
W 
100 
101 
102 
103 
101 
105 
8. Continued 
Industry or sector 
2. Fast-growthindustries 
Electric, electronic equipment; 
optical, precision instruments 
Precision, optical instruments 
and clocks, NP 
Electric and electronic 
equipment, excl. precision 
and optical instruments, NP 
Cables, IQ 
Misc. electrical consumer 
goods, incl. household 
appliances and repair, BP 
Radio, television, phono- 
graph, BP 
Office machinery, electronic 
data processing equipment, NP 
Chemicals 
Chemical investment goods, NP 
Primary 
Ammonia, IQ 
Methanol. IQ 
Intermediate 
Nitrogen fertilizers, IQ 
Phosphate fertilizers, IQ 
Dyestuffs, IQ 
Synthetic fibres, 1Q 
Final consumer goods 
Pharmaceuticals, IQ 
Cosmetics. IQ 
Synthetic and plastic goods 
Plastic goods, NP 
Fine ceramics and glass 
Fine ceramics, NP 
Flat glass, NP 
Hollow glass processing, NP 
3. Fbnner fast-growth industries 
Mineral oil refining 
Motor gasoline, IQ 
Distillate fuel oils, IQ 
Residual fuel oils, IQ 
Mineral oil refining, NP 
Road vehicles and repair, 
air and space ships 
Road vehicles and repair 
(investment goods), NP 
Road vehicles and repair 
(consumer goods), BP 
Motorcycles. bicycles, BP 
Rubber and asbestos goods 
Tires automobile, IQ 
106 
107 
108 
109 
- 
Total Manufacturing NP 22.5 58.8 100.0 101.6 104.5 112.5 
Total Manufacturing NPV 21.9 58.6 100.0 101.6 105.4 112.5 
Tot Manufacturing Output NW 
tf (10 DM at  1970 prices) 65.5 175.4 299.5 304.2 315.5 370.2 

Footnotes for Tabk 8 
Soums: If not o t h e m r  mtated, the indices an compiled from the Net Production Volume in prices 
of 1970 for 20 SYPRO p o u p  at &hit level, r e  Table 5. 
rq = Index imphcit in phyxical quantities of production; see Table 7. 
NP = Net Roduction Index from Stdistirchus bLrnduamt hnga Wahan z w  W c l q f t -  
sentwicklung 1082 updated with IlirtschqfK rcnd Sdistik, Februaq 1084; Sutistischo 
khr ichien .  
BP = "Brutto" (Gross) Production Index from w e  ?iWun, op. cit. 
P = Index implicit in value of output at c u r d  prices (Ffcduktion auspewdhltor h- 
t r i e l h  &kougnisse) converted to constant prices of 1870 (hdoz dcr & s u g e v i s s  
p ~ f i t i c h e r  RoduUe) from FRG S o t i s t i s c h s  Bundasmt. Sdrst isches M u c h ,  
1983, and earlier issuer. 
NVP = Net production volume 
E = Ertrapolated with net production index 
2.3.1.1. Bimmy Metals 
For the production of crude steel ingots (StaMrohblocke and -mmmen) 
there was not only a relative decline. but an actual cutback of production in 
physical terms. From 44.3 million metric tons in 1970 (and 52.6 million metric 
tons in 1974), output fell to 38.5 million metric tons in 197'7. After a short-lived 
recovery that peaked a t  45.4 million metric tons in 1979, output has since con- 
tinuously dwindled to  a level of 35.3 million metric tons in 1983. The result of 
these fiuctuations, superimposed on the clear downward trend set in train by 
the first and second oil price shocks, was that  the amounts of crude steel pro- 
duced in 1982 and 1983 were 20% below their 1970 level and 33% below their 
1979 peak The reasons for the decline of the steel industry are  discussed in 
Section 2.3.3 below in connection with the shrinking demand for constructional 
steel. 
For copper. the cutback in production was less pronounced. The output of 
refined. unwrought copper fell from 405.8 thousand metric tons in 1970 to 374.4 
thousand in 1980. before climbing slowly back to 393.6 thousand in 1982 and 
420.7 thousand metric tons in 1983 (barely 4% above the 1970 level). 
2.3.2. Aluminum- lhe Rception 
For aluminum it  was a different story. The production of unwrought pri- 
mary aluminum increased from 309.0 thousand metric tons in 1970 to a peak of 
741.8 thousand in 1977 and 1979. After that it fell steadily to a low of 723.0 
thousand in 1982 followed by a timid recovery to 743.4 thousand in 1983. A few 
words of explanation for these developments are in order. 
In the 1960s the  FRG, like other European countries, aimed at expanding 
its aluminum capacity through the construction of smelters, in order to reduce 
dependence on imports from Canada and the United States in the face of an 
increasing domestic market. Factors favoring capacity expansion a t  that time 
were low construction costs, subsidized electricity prices (based on the 
expected availability of cheap nuclear power), high international prices for pri- 
mary aluminum (when one US Dollar was approximately equal to four D-Marks), 
and proximity to industrial users. By the end of the 1960s a wave of expansion 
set  in that lasted through 1974. 
However, the unexpected revaluation of the dollar in August 1971 and the 
subsequent plummeting of the exchange rate relative t o  the  D-Mark produced 
major difaculties for the  industry, which were then exacerbated by the oil price 
shock of 1973. Energy costs were not so much of a problem, even though the 

cheap nuclear power did not materialize, because of the industry's long-term 
contracts with electric power plants and t h e  implementation of various 
energy-saving techniques.' 
The difficulties described above provide some explanation for the transition 
of aluminum from a fast-growth, new industry to one that is likely to stagnate 
over the next few years - a factor to be considered when examining the impact 
of structural changes on energy consumption discussed below in Section 3. 
2.3.3. CbnstrcLctiod S e e l ,  Metal A-oda~cts, and Hardware 
The lack of growth in constructional steel production. which includes ship- 
building and locomotives, is quite similar to tha t  of iron and steel. The share of 
constructional steel in total manufacturing output decreased without interrup- 
tion from 4.687. in 1950 to 2.48% in 1980. By 1980, t h e  index implicit in the net  
volume of production was only 32 above the 1970 level and 117. below that  for 
1973. 
To some extent the heavy decline in steel production and the fabrication of 
constructional steel are  due to the displacement O F  steel by lighter materials, 
such as more concrete in  highway bridges or more plastic in cars. and the 
replacement of steel by plastics or aluminum in the manufacture of refrigera- 
tors, washing machines, and cans, the displacement of canning itself by deep 
freezing, etc. Other industries producing investment goods such as the con- 
struction of nonelectrical machinery. have themselves become slow-growth 
industries, while some steel-using activities, such as shipbuilding, have ceased 
to grow or have gone out of style, as for example locomotive construction (see 
also Tables B and 9). 
One very strong reason for the  decline in the  production of investment 
goods, for which iron and steel and const~uctional  steel are important inputs, is 
tha t  when the post-World War I1 reconstruction had run its course, infrastruc- 
ture  building was largely complete in the FRG and elsewhere. for example the 
United States. Consequently, the demand for steel dried up as the construction 
of highways, bridges, and tunnels, or  the  laying and expansion of urban under- 
ground railways gave way to mainly upkeep and maintenance operations. This 
tailing off of the infrastructure boom was also a major factor in the decline of 
the  stone, sand, and clay industry, as discussed in Section 2.3.5 below. 
In contrast to constructional steel, the relative decline of metal products 
and hardware was less severe: their share in total manufacturing fell from 
7.192 in 1950 to 6.17% in 1980. 
2.3.4.  Nonelectrical Machanery Construction (Ehgheering) 
In the 1950s. the construction of nonelectrical machinery was still a rela- 
tively fast-growing industry, whose share in total manufacturing output 
increased from 12.21% in 1950 to 13.24% in 1960 and to 13.66% in 1961. After 
tha t  time. however, its share decreased continuously to 11.45% in 1970 and 
further to 9.887. in 1980. In terms of the index (1970 = loo), production in this 
industry reached only 106 in 1980 (considerably below the national average of 
123.6); production continued to decline in the early 1980s, so that  by 1983 i t  
had fallen slightly below the levels of 1970 and 1973. 
*For details of the structural change in the aluminum smelting ind.ytrp in the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan, w e  the papers submitted by Y.J. Peck, C. ibrchner, A Goto, and others 
to the Task Force Meeting on S r u c t u d  O u m g e  in the World Aluminum h t r y  held at the Inter- 
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysii, Laxenburg, Austria, 2-4 May. 1881. 
While the production of food processing machines followed very closely the 
growth trend for nonelectrical machinery as a whole, this was not the  case for 
agricultural machinery. where output fared relatively rather  better. On the  
other hand. metalworking and the  textiles, sewing. and leatherworking 
machines group fared much worse, reflecting the plight of the industries they 
serve. For example. in 1983 the gross production index (1970 = 100) hit 75.8 for 
metalworking and 69.9 for the  textiles, sewing, and leatherworking machines 
group. 
8.3.5. S o n e ,  Sand, and  Clay (including Cement) 
Cement, which is an  important component of this industry, requires a high 
energy input. The industry also includes other traditional building materials 
such as bricks, whose production is energy intensive. The continuous relative 
decline of this industry can be seen in the  decline of i ts  share in manufacturing 
as a whole from 4.48% in 1950 to 3.46% in 1970, and further to  3.0% in 1980. The 
slow growth of the  industry has already been discussed in Section 2.3.3 above in 
connection with the  decline in the demand for steel for infrastructure activi- 
ties. 
Cement production, because of its energy-intensive nature, deserves some 
h r t h e r  analysis. From 1970 to 1972, the  production indexes (1970 = 100) for 
the  groups "stone, sand. and clay" and "cement" were identical. However, since 
1973, the  year of the  first oil price explosion, cement production has fallen 
much faster than that  of the  group as a whole. Measured in physical quantities, 
the  1983 cement production of 32.2 million metric tons was 19% below the 1970 
level (38.3 million metric  tons) and 28% below the  1972 peak. 
The explanation for the decline of the stone, sand, and clay industry 
(including cement) is similar to  that  for iron and steel and constructional steel. 
discussed above in Section 2.3.3. 
2.3.6. Liurnbw and Shwrnills, Cellulose, M p ,  and P q e r  
The group of industries including lumber and sawmills, cellulose, pulp, and 
"raw" (unueredelt) paper is worth examining, because its energy requirements 
a re  rather  high, especially for raw paper. 
Both industries' shares in total manufacturing output decreased between 
1950 and 1970, from 2.11 t o  0.84% for lumber and sawmills, and from 1.40 to  
0.97% for the  paper industry. However, in the 1970s the output from lumber 
end sawmills moved up in step with total manufacturing, while output from the  
cellulose, pulp. and paper industry rose faster than total manufacturing. In 
physical quantities, raw paper production rose from 4.4 million metric tons in 
1970 to 8.6 million tons in 1982, or by 50% which is far more than tha t  for 
manufacturing as  a whole. 
2.3.7. Teztiles, k c l u d i n g  a o  thing 
The decline of textiles (excluding clothing) is quite characteristic of the 
developed countries. The share of this industry in total manufacturing in the  
FFG continuously decreased from 7.74% in 1950 to 3.69% in 1980; during the  
1950s and 1960s oufput was still growing, though a t  a far slower rate than for 
manufacturing as a whole. In the  1970s growth became very weak. For some 
products there was an absolute decline. For instance, the production of cotton 
and woollen woven fabrics in 1970 were respectively 30% and 33.6% less than 
they had been in 1962. By 1983, the output of cotton fabrics had slumped t o  
12X below the level of 1970, and woollen fabrics to more than 40% below the  
1870 level. Woven fabrics from cellulose fiber, which was still a growth industry 
in the 1980s (though not as much as i t  had been in the 1950s), also slumped in 
the 1970s, but not as much as cotton and wool. 
2.3.8. Fbod, h e m g e s ,  a d  Tobacco 
The share of the food, beverages, and tobacco industry in total manufac- 
turing output in the FRG decreased from 13.22% in 1950 to 10.31% in 1970. It 
later increased a little to 10.99% in 1980. Thus, in 1980 the percentage share of 
the food group was somewhat higher than that  of nonelectrical machinery 
(9.88%), which was discussed above. 
However, not all of the components of the  food, beverages, and tobacco 
group moved a t  the same pace. Unfortunately, there is no easy way of disaggre- 
gating the  food sector, for its component industries may well have followed very 
diverse growth paths. A breakdown a t  a fairly high level of aggregation may be 
gleaned from the net production index; this shows that in the 1970s and 
through 1981 food taken by itself moved a t  about the same pace as  the  food, 
beverages, and tobacco group. But in the recession years of 1982 and 1983, food 
expanded faster than did the group as a whole. 
Within the  food group, not all the constituent industries developed a t  the 
same rate. Based on the index numbers implicit in the physical production 
quantities shorn in Table 9, the production of some commodities, such a s  sugar 
and especially sausage and meats, increased rather rapidly in the 1970s. with 
very little let-up in the growth rate through the recession of the 1980s. As a 
result, the  1970 = 100 based index for sugar rose to 176.2 in 1982. while tha t  for 
sausage and meats climbed to 219.5. At the same time, the index for margarine 
production, which showed no growth during the  1970s. was down to 95.2 in 1982. 
These indicators somehow reflect the fact tha t  by 1982 the recession (which 
came later  to the FRG than to the United States) had not yet made much of an 
impact on household incomes. 
Some of the changes within the FRG food industry were due to changes in 
technology and taste. For instance, the production of canned fruit - which is of 
course affected by good and bad harvests as well as taste - expanded very little 
in the 1970s; the expansion in 1982 was due mostly to the record harvest. At 
the same time, the fad for fruit juices shows in the index of production, which 
raced. without a pause for either the first or the second oil-price-induced reces- 
sion. from 100 in 1970 to 347.1 in 1982. 
The expansion of other beverage industries, such as beer and liquor, was 
less spectacular. Perhaps these beverages were adversely affected by the grow- 
ing taste for fruit juices. In 1982, the output of beer was only 10% above that of 
1970. while that  of liquor (including wines) had slumped to 4% below the  1970 
level. The liquor industry may also have suffered from the inroads made by 
foreign wines. 
Tobacco processing generally grew faster than food in the 1974-1981 
period. But in the recession years of 1982 and 1983, its growth lagged behind 
that of food. This could be an effect of the recession and/or due to heightened 
anti-smoking consciousness. 
2.9.9. MisceUaneous Cohsurne~ Goods, ficluding Faod 
The share in total FRG manufacturing of miscellaneous consumer goods, 
excluding food, continuously decreased from 14.37% in 1950 to 9.49% in 1980. 
This group includes paper and cardboard goods, printing, leather making and 
leather goods (including shoes), clothing, wood processing and furniture, rnusi- 
cal instruments, toys. and other miscellaneous light industries. These 
industries are lumped together in the energy balances, because of their rela- 
tively modest energy requirements. They are. however, of considerable impor- 
tance when we come to study the  impact of foreign trade. For this reason, 
disaggregation of the group would be very useful. To make up for this 
shortcoming, attention is drawn t o  the production indexes (1970 = 100) in Table 
8, which indicate diderences in growth rates. It can be seen that  paper and 
cardboard, and also printing, were growing through 1983 a t  a faster rate than 
both the  miscellaneous group as a whole and total manufacturing industries. 
On the other hand. many of the  miscellaneous industries suffered not only rela- 
tive, but also absolute decline, particularly in the  1970s; these include leather 
producing, leather goods excluding shoes, shoes, and clothing. Hardest hit, 
possibly through foreign imports, was the  shoe industry. Its 1983 output, as 
measured by the gross production index, had tumbled to 45% below the 1970 
level - and almost back to the level of 1950. 
Clothing, as measured by the  ne t  production index, fell by 1983 to  30% 
below i ts  1970 mark - which had still been about double that  of 1950. For musi- 
cal instruments and toys, etc., output declined after 1970. The net index of pro- 
duction (1970 = 100). after reaching a peak of 111.8 in 1978, subsequently tum- 
bled to 87.0 in 1983. 
The analysis presented above of the slow-growth industries has shown that  
there are a few whose growth only recently slowed down, for instance lumber 
and sawmills, cellulose, pulp, (raw) papei, and food, beverages, and tobacco. 
Whether this reflects a new trend in structural  change - or whether it is merely 
a temporary occurrence related to the recession - only time will tell. 
2.4. Fast-Growth Industries 
The group of industries tha t  grew faster than total manufacturing 
increased their share in total output from 15.56% in 1950 to 31.84% in 1980. 
This group is largely composed of the more "sophisticated" industries that util- 
ize more recently developed technologies, such as electric and electronic 
equipment production, much of i t  directly based on innovation, the chemicals 
and allied industries, synthetic, plastic goods, and more recently the manufac- 
ture  of fine ceramics. The behavior of this  group has been in marked contrast 
to that of, for example, the  comparatively "simple" nonelectrical machinery 
construction industry, which is mainly based on older, established technolo- 
gies, and has relatively declined during the  period studied. 
2.4.1. EZectric and Electronic Equipment ,  @tical and Precision ins t ruments  
The group with the highest share in the  ne t  volume of production is elec- 
tric and electronic equipment, including optical and precision instruments. 
The combined share of these industries in total manufacturing output has risen 
from 6.53% in 1950 to 14.35% in 1980. Both electric and electronic equipment 
and the optical and precision instruments industry require a relatively low 
energy input. For this reason they were combined in the energy balances that 
served as  a model for the  classification of the  net production volume. However, 
for a broader analysis of structural change, and one that took into considera- 
tion foreign trade as well as energy. it would have been preferable not to com- 
bine the two industry groups. This is because. since 1970, the two industries 
have followed different growth paths, as can be seen from the indexes of net 
production shown in Table 6. 
8.4.1.1. @tical and R e c i s i o n  h f n u n e n l s  
Optical and precision instruments have long played a traditional role in 
German exports. From 1950 to 1970, the growth in the  production of optical 
and precision instruments was quite similar to that of the  electric equipment 
industry. However in the  1970s and 1980s, production of optical and precision 
instruments showed generally negative growth. The 1970 = 100 based index of 
net  production was either actually below or only slightly above 100 through 
1977. In 1978 and 1979 i t  went up to 108.5 and 112.2, respectively, but it subse- 
quently fell again to stand a t  98.1 in 1983. 
2.4.1.2. ELectric a d  Electronic Equipment 
The growth of the  electric and electronic equipment industry, as measured 
by the net  production index, was quite strong in the 1970s through 1977. This 
gave way to stagnation in 1978, followed again by renewed growth in 1979 and 
1980. However, the recession years brought a small dip in 1981 and stagnation 
in 1982 and 1993. Despite the  slackening of the industry's growth rate, 1983 
production of electric and electronic equipment was still nearly 35% above the 
1970 level - which was considerably more than the corresponding figure (13.5%) 
for manufacturing as a whole. 
However. not all branches of the electric and electronic equipment indus- 
t ry experienced the same growth. Those that are closely tied to the provision of 
infrastructure expanded a t  a much slower rate, while some of them even 
experienced negative growth. For example, in the early and mid-1970s. cable 
manufacturing fell until in 1977 it hit a low of 20% below its 1970 level. Some of 
this fall may be explained by the fact that output is measured in tons, and since 
there may have been a shift from heavier to lighter materials during the period 
this could have introduced some bias. The industry started to grow again in 
1978, but the expansion was short-lived: a new peak was reached in 1980 but 
this was still below the 1974 peak With the subsequent decreases in 1981 and 
1982, cable production eventually tumbled to 19% below its 1970 level. 
In contrast to the behavior of cables and other infrastructure related to 
electrical equipment, the  slackening in the growth of the production of house- 
hold appliances seems to be of more recent date. The recent. relatively poor 
performance of this latter group may have contributed substantially to the 
recent weakening of the growth rate of electric and electronic equipment pro- 
duction as a whole. The production index for household appliances is available 
as part of the gross production of "other electrical consumer goods, including 
household appliances and repair". The output of this group, which excludes 
radios and TVs, peaked in 1980. when the 1970 = 100 based gross production 
index stood a t  147.3. I t  subsequently fell to a low of 126.2 in 1982, followed by 
an increase to 138.0 in 1983. 
The performance of the household appliances industry contrasts with the 
growth of the radio, television, and phonographic industry. for which the index 
of  TOSS production (1970 = 100) climbed almost uninterruptedly, so that by 
1983 output was nearly 90% above the 1970 level. This growth. of course, is still 
trivial in comparison with the spectacular development of "office machinery 
and electronic data processing," which is an example of the innovation industry 
par ezcellence. The 1970 = 100 based net production index shot up to a peak of 
140.6 in 1974 (data for 1975 are  presently not available). There was a mild 
slump in 1975/76 when the recession brought on by the f i s t  oil price explosion 
hit the FRG. However, since 1977 the spectacular growth of the o&e 
machinery and electronic equipment group has been resumed. with even more 
momentum gained through the  recession of the early 1980s. As a result, the 
net  production index stood a t  323.9 in 1983. 
2.4.2. Chemicals 
The share of chemicals in total manufacturing in the FRG rose from 6.68% 
in 1950 to  12.44% in 1980. The chemicals group includes a variety of industries, 
some producing primary or basic chemicals, others intermediate products such 
es fertilizers, dyestuffs, and synthetic fibers, and others again final products 
like pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. Each of these subgroups differs in i ts 
energy requirements and in the proportion of value added i t  generates. A 
disaggregation of the chemicals group according to these or other subgroups is 
unfortunately not available in the  German statistical literature. Yet this sort of 
disaggregation would be of great  value in analyzing the impacts of structural 
changes on energy demand. In the  absence of disaggregated data, these 
impacts can only be surmised from a study of production indexes calculated 
from the output (in physical terms) of a number of specific chemical industries 
and estimates of energy demand and value added for recent years reported in 
the  German Statistical Office's monthly publications on turnover, energy. and 
labor input.' 
In contrast to the expansion of the  chemicals industry as a whole, the pro- 
duction of primary chemicals stagnated in the  1970s and fell with the recession 
of the  1980s. This can be seen from the  1970 = 100 based indexes (see Table 9), 
which show that  by 1983 ammonia production was a t  93.5 and methanol even 
further  down a t  77.4. Some of the  intermediate chemicals did not do much 
better. The corresponding indexes for nitrogen fertilizers dropped to  61.3 in 
1982, followed by a modest recovery to 67.8 in 1983. Phosphate fertilizer fell to 
59.6 in 1982 (no data are as yet available for 1983). Organic dyestuffs made 
from tar  were a t  one time the  showpiece of German chemical production. How- 
ever, from the production quantities shown in Table 9, i t  seems tha t  this 
industry's growth over the period studied was no more than the  national aver- 
age (total manufacturing). which is itself less than that for chemicals as  a 
whole. Dyestuff production peaked in 1976, when the 1970 = 100 based index 
rose to  142.9. It has since regressed with minor fluctuations, but has never 
again reached the 1976 level; in 1983 t h e  index stood a t  122.9. 
While fertilizers and dyestuffs did not do well, synthetic fibers did very well 
indeed. The production index (1970 = 100) climbed to  171.8 in 1992. well above 
t h e  levels for total manufacturing and for chemicals as  a whole. 
Unfortunately, there is no way of measuring the  output in physical quanti- 
t ies of pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. There a re  also no indexes for either ne t  
o r  gross production volumes. For this reason a volume index was compiled 
from the gross production values a t  cu r ren t  prices, adjusted by the growth of 
prices appropriate for each particular industry. This admittedly crude device 
shows tha t  the output of pharmaceuticals (like that of synthetic fibers) 
increased by more than the national average, and also by more than chemicals 
es a whole. The 1970 = 100 based index for pharmaceuticals stood a t  173 in 
1982; since then, growth has been almost continuous, with only minor stagna- 
tion in 1976/77. 
For cosmetics, an index constructed along similar lines also shows almost 
uninterrupted growth, punctuated by only minor cutbacks, quickly overcome, 
in 1975/76, 1979, and 1981. As a result,  the 1992 output of cosmetics is 
estimated to have topped the 1970 level by more than 50%. 
*SXdistischss BwrQsamt .  Ffoduriemndss Cswar6s. W s c w i g u n g ,  h a t z  und E h s r g i u v o r s ~  
gung, in I;hchssTi. 4 Aih. 4.1.1, 1860. 
24 .3 .  *the& Rmtic Coo& and A n e  Ceramics 
The shares of synthetic and plastic goods and of fine ceramics (which 
includes micro-chips) increased, respectively, From 0.22 and 2.13% in 1950 to 
2.81 and 2.24% in 1980. The strong growth of synthetic and plastic goods 
manufacturing is another example of the growth of innovation industries. The 
same is true to  some extent For fine ceramics, including glass. Actually, this 
lat ter  group was a relatively declining, slow-growth industry in the period 
1950-1970, during which its share in total manufacturing decreased from 2.31 
t o  1.81%. However, its share then recovered to 2.29% by 1980. This comeback 
may have been due to the growth of components used in connection with elec- 
tronic data processing. 
2.5. Former Past- Growth  Industries 
The mineral oil refining. vehicles and repair, and rubber and asbestos 
industries all experienced much faster growth than total manufacturing during 
the  1950s and 1960s. The combined share of these industries in total output 
rose From 5.68% in 1950 to 13.62% in 1970. This growth was nearly as fast as 
tha t  experienced by the electric and electronic equipment industry, and cer- 
tainly faster than the growth of chemicals. Eowever, in the 1970s electric and 
electronics equipment enjoyed continuous, rapid growth (thanks in part to the 
innovation industries), and so did chemicals (mostly because of the growth of 
final consumer goods and a few intermediate products), but the growth of 
mineral oil refining, vehicles and repair, and rubber and asbestos markedly 
slowed down. 
2.5.1. Mined  Refining 
Based on the net volume of production, the total output of the mineral oil 
refining industry peaked in 1973, when the 1970 = 100 based production index 
stood a t  110.5. A subsequent fall to a low of 95.6 in 1975 was quickly overcome 
as output reached a new and higher peak of 119.3 in 1979, giving way thereafter 
to  a prolonged slowdown consisting of an  initial fall followed by stagnation. It is 
worth noting that the slowdown of total mineral oil refining did not materialize 
until after the second oil shock, when the  output of motor gasoline finally 
stopped growing. Measured in physical quantities, 1983 gasoline production was 
still a good 20% above 1973. and 45% above the  1970 level. This development 
paralleled FRC consumption of motor gasoline. which also raced on through 
1980, whereas in other developed countries such as the United States the reces- 
sion came earlier and cut somewhat deeper into gasoline consumption.* 
But not all of the output of mineral oil refineries expanded by as much as 
gasoline. The reaction of the fuel oils to the oil price explosions came earlier, 
and was more serious. The 1970 = 100 based index implicit in the quantities of 
distilled fuel oil produced peaked first a t  120.6 in 1973 and a second time in 
1979; but by 1980, production was down to 8% above the 1970 level (later data 
a re  not  readly  available). For residual fuel oils, production cutbacks were still 
more serious. Output peaked twice, in 1973 and 1979; but the second peak was 
considerably below the first, and by 1980 production had slumped to nearly 40% 
below the level of 1970 (for details see Tables 8 and 9). 
*See also C. Dobh, 7ha h & n g  01 Urs h o r g y  Coefic ionf .  Invited Paper for the Seventh Interna- 
tional ScienMc Forum on New Energy Realities, organized by the University of kami,  Center for 
Theoretical Studies. Novenber 1883 The paper is in press as part of the conference proceedings. 
The discrepancy between these developments for gasoline and fuel-oil pro- 
duction may also have been influenced by price policies. No substantial price 
increase for gasoline materialized until after the second oil price shock while 
in the intershock period gasoline prices including taxes were not substantially 
raised. When adjusted for inflation, gasoline prices stagnated and a t  t imes 
actually decreased during the intershock period. This was quite similar to the 
observed development of gasoline prices in other developed countries, e.g. the 
United States. At the same time, in the FRG and elsewhere, fuel-oil prices 
increased much more, and much sooner, than  did those for gasoline. 
2.5.2. Rubber and Asbestos 
The impact of the "energy crisis" on the production of tires was more 
direct than  i t  had been on the production and consumption of motor gasoline. 
The index implicit in the physical output quantities shows that  the production 
of tires, like that discussed above for fuel oils, peaked in 1973. After that  year, 
production was cu t  back continuously. so that  by 1982 the index was 4% below 
the  level of 1970 and 13% below that of 1973. 
2.5.3. Road Vehicles m d  Repair, Aircralt and @ace S i p s  
The share of road vehicles and repair, aircraft and space ships in total 
manufacturing increased from 3.26% in 1950 to 8.25% in 1970, but reached only 
8.88% by 1980. The growth of automobile production significantly slotved down 
in the 1970s; but was this because the industry had come of age or  because it 
felt the  impact of the  oil crisis? Or were both factors a t  work? 
The output of automobiles, including trucks and bicycles, is measured by 
two production indexes: the index of net production of road vehicles serving as 
investment goods, and the  index of gross production of road vehicles regarded 
a s  private, consumer goods. The latter shows the tremendous expansion of the 
automobile industry. The gross production index moved from 5.0 in 1950 t o  
34.8 in 1960. with an even steeper growth to  100.0 in 1970. The fact that  auto- 
mobile production expanded more in the 1960s than in the 1950s is in marked 
contrast  to the growth-rate behavior of total manufacturing (and GDP) dis- 
cussed elsewhere in this report. 
Automobile production slumped for the first t ime after the first oil price 
explosion. when the 1970 = 100 based gross production index fell to 90.3 in 
1974. In the intershock period, output picked up again, reaching a second peak 
in 1979. However, the second peak only reached about the same level as the 
first in 1973. Output fell slightly in 1980, but despite the recession i t  subse- 
quently picked u p  again, so much so that in 1983 a third peak was reached, 
which topped the  twin peaks of 1973 and 1979 by about 10% and the 1970 level 
by more than 20%. 
The recovery of road vehicles regarded as investment goods (mostly trucks 
and buses) was even stronger than that of private motor vehicles. Measured in 
t e rms  of the net production index, output in the recession years of the early 
1980s climbed steadily, reaching a 1983 level that  was 37% above the 1970 
figure. 
This recent comeback for the German automobile industry is remarkable 
and somewhat counter-cyclical. It is, however, too early t o  tell whether the 
1983 resurgence in automobile production was just a passing event or whether 
i t  has a more permanent character. 
3.1. Introduction 
3.1.1. Final Energy Demand for Manufacturing ad Total 
National Aim- Energy Consumption 
The manufacturing sector's demand for final energy comes from the sec- 
tion on manufacturing in the published Energy Balances of the  FRG.. The 
crude oil input to refineries and petroleum used as feedstocks for the chemi- 
cals industry were added from the non-manufacturing section of the Balances. 
For this reason, the  energy data, prepared for Par t  11 of this study and used 
here as well, are 13-14% higher than the final energy demand of the  manufac- 
turing sector measured a t  the source. For details see Tables 10 and 11. 
In 1950, the  demand for final energy by the  manufacturing sector was 41.4 
million metric tons of hard coal equivalent (TCE), and the total primary energy 
consumption of the FRG amounted to 124.4 million TCE. Except for a minor 
cutback in 1966167 the demand for energy rose steadily, till in 1973 i t  reached 
106.6 million TCE for final demand by the manufacturing sector and 371.9 mil- 
lion TCE for total primary demand from all sectors. 
The impact on the manufacturing sector's energy demand of the recession 
caused by the oil price explosion of November 1973 resulted first in stagnation 
(1974), followed by a severe cutback to 94.1 million TCE in 1975. Total primary 
energy demand fell immediately in 1974, and still further in 1975, when i t  
reached a low of 243.2 million TCE. However, this decrease was quickly over- 
come, and with subsequent expansion - though a t  a slower growth rate than 
before - total primary energy demand reached a new peak in 1979 tha t  sur- 
passed the levels of 1973 and 1970. The resurgence was due to the fact tha t  the  
consumption particularly of gasoline but also of total household energy 
resumed their growth a t  prerecession rates through 1979. However, for final 
energy demand from the manufacturing sector there was not much growth dur- 
ing the economic recovery that took place in the intershock period.** 
The rather weak growth in the final energy demand for manufacturing in 
1976 was followed by stagnation in 1977 and 1978. During the  short-lived expan- 
sion of steel production, demand hit a new peak of 104.5 million TCE in 1979. 
This second peak, in contrast to the behavior of total primary demand. 
remained below the level of 1973 and was only slightly above that of 1970. 
What was the effect of the second oil price explosion on energy demand? 
Gasoline consumption continued to move upward and peaked in 1980; it dropped 
only slightly in 1981 and 1982. and picked up again in 1983, by which time i t  had 
returned to  the  level of 1979. 
Total household energy consumption peaked in 1979 and fell in 1980-1982, 
after which stagnation and a minor upturn in 1983 brought demand back to  the 
level of 1974. But demand from the manufacturing sector was more seriously 
affected. From its peak in 1979 it fell continuously till it reached a low of 85.5 , 
million TCE in 1982, which came close to  the level already reached much 
*Arbratsysmeinschqft k3wtgisbilontsn. h c r p b i l a n z s n  d a t  hn&smpubLak llkutschlund, 
prepwed annually by R. Gabel of the Rrbcitsgomoinschoft h r g i a b i l a n z e n  in Essen, and published 
by krlags- und R r f s c ~ s s s l l s c ~ t  d s t  DskfTirifdknuerks in FrsnldufL, FRG. 
*.See &o Claire Doblin, h Ckowth oJ Cbnrumpfion and %ss in Urs VSA, FRC, F t w u s ,  and 
th. UK 1850- 1880. Research Report RR-82- 18. In:ernationd Institute for Applied Systenu Andysir, 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
Table 10. The changing structure of demand for final energy in the manufac- 
turing sector of the F'RG, 1950-82; percentage shares. 
Industry 
Primary metals 
Iron and steela 
Nonferrous 
chemicalsb 
Mineral oil refining 
Stone, sand and clay, 
incl. cement 
Food. beverages, tobacco 
Cellulose, pulp, paper 
Tertiles, excl. clothing 
Nonelectrical machinery 
construction 
Road vehicles, incl. 
repair, air and 
space ships 
Fine ceramics, glass 
Electric and electronic 
equipment, optical 
and precision instruments 
Fabricated metal products, 
hardware 
Constructional steel, 
shipbuilding 
Rubber and asbestos goods 
Synthetics and plastic 
goods 
Lumber, sawmills 
Miscellaneous: 
Paper and cardboard goods 
Printing 
Leather and leather goods 
Clothing 2.3 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 
Wood furniture 
Musical instruments, toys 
Total in percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total in lo6 TCE 41.4 75.0 102.1 106.6 99.7 85.8 
Total in 1015 Joule 1213 2197 2991 3122 2926 2514 
Note: 1 0 % ~  = 29.29 x 1015 Joule 
Includes iron and steel, steel foundries and drawing. 
Includes crude oil used as a feedstock. 
Source: compiled from Arbei.tsgem&nschaft hrergiebilanzen. Ehergiebilanzen der 
Bundesrepublik hutschlcmd 1982 Table 3.2 and earlier issues. Annual data through 
1980 are available on IIASA computer printouts. 
Note: Feedstocks for chemicals and crude oil for refineries were added from the non- 
manufacturing sections of the Etwrgtebilanzen. 
Table 11. The growth of demand for Anal energy by the manufacturing industries in the FRC. 1950-83; index numbers. 
1970 = 100. 
Industry 1 1950 1 lM 1 1070 1 1871 1 1872 
~ a:
Iron and mteel 
Steel ioundriem 
Steel drawing 
Nonferroum metals 
Chernicals (basic, 
fibers and ~ t h e r s ) ~  
Mineral oil refiningb 
Stone, send, clay, incl. cement 
Cellulose, pulp, paper 
Lumber, sawm~lls 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Textilem, excl. clothing 
Constructional steel 
Machinery, no~~electrical 
Road vehicles 
Electric and electronic 
equipment, etc. 
Metal fabricated productm 
Fine ceramics, glass 
Rubber and asbestos 
Synthetic and plastic goodm 
Mi~oellaneous 
Total 
In 10' TCE 
In 10' J 
N o u n  and wurcem n e  Table 10. 
PE p~.eUmlnuy emumate. 
I 
61.1 
47.8 
45,8 
40.7 
12.8 
53.1 
42.8 
42.1 
53.8 
60.3 
50.6 
20.2 
15.4 
29.2 
38.6 
40.7 
33.4 
8.0 
48.7 
40.5 
41.4 
1212.6 
84.8 
113.8 
68.5 
77.6 
82.8 
33.0 
82.4 
68.5 
51.8 
76.5 
87.4 
88.5 
53.6 
41.0 
53.8 
64.8 
77.4 
63.7 
27.3 
61.6 
73.5 
75.0 
2188.7 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
102.1 
2880.5 
08.0 
01.0 
84.5 
108.7 
100.7 
100.0 
104.5 
09.1 
. I  
103.0 
101.0 
01.0 
100.8 
104.3 
100.8 
08.2 
101.2 
101.3 
114.0 
101.4 
07.4 
00.5 
2014.4 
01.3 
86.1 
85.6 
111.4 
87.1 
101.1 
108.2 
08.0 
105.3 
102.7 
100.8 
85.0 
104.8 
111.0 
104.8 
100.8 
103.8 
100.3 
127.1 
108.2 
90.0 
100.8 
2855.4 
-
earlier in 1966/67. According t o  preliminary data, the downslide seemed later 
to  have been arrested with a mild recovery in 1983. 
The growth of total primary energy consumption, as well as  tha t  of dnal 
energy demand for the  industry, household, and road transportation (gasoline) 
sectors, is shown as index numbers (1970 = 100) in Figure 3, for the period 
1970-1983. 
1nO.x nu-. 
1970 - la 
Figure 3. FRC Energy Consumption. Total Primary and by Sectors: Industry. 
Households and Road Transport (Gasoline). 1970-1983. Index Numbers. 1970 = 
100. 
Following the  f i s t  oil price explosion in 1973, total primary energy con- 
sumption in the FRG and other  Western developed countries expanded more 
slowly and contracted more quickly than GDP. In the FRC, as elsewhere, the 
"breaking of the energy coefficient" was hailed as a sign of energy savings, pro- 
moted by the unprecedented growth in energy prices.' The energy savings 
theory was further substantiated by the observation that  total manufacturing 
output expanded faster and contracted less than total energy input. Examina- 
tion of the flows of output from and h a 1  energy inputs to individual manufac- 
turing industries is expected to throw some light on a number of questions. Is 
the cutback in energy demand the result of voluntary savings, such as those 
resulting from technologically more efficient fuel utilization? And/or is the 
cutback the  result of s tructural  changes in the manufacturing profile of the 
FRG or of the general slowdown in the  rate of growth of manufacturing as a 
whole? Answers to these questions can only be surmised or inferred from the 
flows of energy and  output a t  disaggregated levels. An effort to quantify the 
effects of technological and  structural  changes is made by Michael Kraus in the 
second part of this study. 
3.1.2. final Eherpy firnand l o r  Manulac turing and Value Ad& d 
In the FRG, as in other  industrialized countries such as the  United States. 
the major part of the manufacturing sector's demand for final energy comes 
from just a few industries t h a t  a re  associated with relatively low value added. A 
*See also Claire h b h ,  l?w bho&ng 01 the h e t g y  CbslJkiant. heted paper for tbe Seventh Inter- 
national Scienk5c Forum on New Energy Realities orgaaized by the University of Ylami, Center for 
Theoretical St.~dies. November 1983. The paper is m press w pa.. of 'he conference proceedings 
comparison of the  percentage structure of final energy demand and of net pro- 
duction volume (which corresponds to the concept of gross value added) is sum- 
marized below for a few selected industries. The summary has been compiled 
from the tables on the  structure of output (Table 7) and demand for tlnal 
energy (Table 10). In those tables, the industries producing primary, inter- 
mediate, and final chemical goods were lumped together as one group. In view 
of the fact that  primary chemicals are the most energy-intensive, we attempted 
to  separate this group from the rest,  on the basis of an FRG survey of employ- 
ment,  turnover. and energy consumption for the  year  1980.* We estimated tha t  
primary chemicals (SYPRO 4031) account for 05% of the energy requirements 
and 50% of the  value added for chemicals as a whole (SYPRO 40). The data on 
dnal energy and value added for selected industries in 1980, shown in Table 12, 
indicate that  as  much as 72.9% of final energy was used by industry groups 
whose combined value added amounted to only 30.5% of the total, while 48.9% of 
value added was generated by industries tha t  used only 12.6% of total final 
energy. 
Table 12. Final energy input and gross value added for selected industries in 
the  FRG, 1980; percentage shares. 
Industry Final Gross Industry Final Gross 
energy value 
input (7.) addeda (2) 
energy value 
input (2) addeda (2) 
Primary metals Electric acd electronic 
Iron and steel 28.1 5.3 equipment 2.3 14.4 
Nonferrous metals 4.0 1.4 Nonelectrical macknery 2.7 9.9 
Primary chemicals 13.3~ 6.2' Road vehicles 3.4 8.9 
Mineral oil reking 12.2 3.6 Fabricated metal, 
Stone, sand, and clay hardware 2.1 6.2 
(incl. cement) 8.9 3.0 Misc. consumer goods 2.1 9.5 
Total 66.5 19.5 Total 12.6 48.9 
Net volume of production in 1980, but at IBM prices. 
' Estimated as 85% of energy requirements for chemicals as  a whole. 
Eatimated as 50% of value added for chemicals aa a whole. 
The discrepancy between energy input and value added would have been 
more drastic had i t  been possible to  use n e t  instead of gross value added data, 
since gross value added is inflated by production taxes, which are  fairly high for 
liquor and tobacco, and especially for mineral oil refining (Mne~aloLsteuer). 
3.2. The Impact of Structural Changes in lndustry on R o n  of 
Rnal Energy Demand from the Manufacturing Sector 
A comparison of the  indexes of production for manufacturing as a whole 
(Table 0) and total input of Anal energy (Table 11) shows clearly that the growth 
of energy demand has continuously lagged behind that  of output, measured in 
te rms of value added. One major explanatory factor has been the long-term 
structural changes discussed earlier in Section 2. In other words, the relative 
Sdlrtischus W l n d o s a m t .  h c w t i g u n g ,  U m s d z  und h e r g i o w r s o r g u n g  dsr Lrnternohmsn 
und &trio& im m b a u  und tm v o r w b e i t e n d e n  C e w r b e ,  1880. Fhchsoria 4, Wiha 4.1.1. 
decline of the  energy-intensive industries since tbe 1950s and 1960s was exa- 
cerbated during the  1970s when a few of these industries experienced an abso- 
lute decline in quantities produced. 
The most prominent examples here a r e  the  iron and steel producing indus- 
tries, which alone commanded as much as 28.1% of the final energy tha t  went 
into the  entire manufacturing sector in 1980. I t  is obvious that  any drop in 
either the  relative or absolute growth of this industry will significantly d e c t  
the  demand for energy of the manufacturing sector a s  a whole. 
The second-largest users of final energy are  the chemicals and allied 
industries. I t  is t rue tha t  tbe  group as a whole belongs to the  fast-growth 
category; however, i t  covers the  manufacture of a wide diversity of products, a t  
the  basic, intermediate, and final consumer goods stages. Although the latter,  
i.e. pharmaceuticals, toiletries. etc., grew rapidly, tbeir energy requirements 
are  relatively modest; the sluggish growth and in the 1970s the absolute decline 
of basic chemicals (see Table 10) predominated in terms of energy demand over 
the  growth of final consumer goods so that .  overall, chemicals contributed 
significantly to the  slow growth in the  total energy demand of manufacturing. 
Other slow-growth industries tha t  acted as depressants on final energy 
demand for manufacturing are stone, sand, and clay (including cement) and 
the  food, beverages, and tobacco group, whose shares in total energy demand 
were 8.9 and 6.4%, respectively, in 1983. The slow-growth energy-intensive 
industries were joined by mineral oil reflning during the lat ter  part of the  
period studied. Its importance as  a user of energy can be seen from the  fact 
tha t  in 1980 i t  absorbed as much as 12.2% of t he  total energy used in manufac- 
turing. This is therefore a former fast-growth industry, whose output slowed 
down under the  impact of the  "oil crisis." 
However, structural changes in the mix of industrial production, namely 
the slow growth of the  energy-intensive industries. and the  faster growth of 
industries with lower energy requirements (e.g. electrical equipment, espe- 
cially computers. etc.) are not the only, though they may be the major reason 
for the decline in energy demand. Another factor that  may have had some 
bearing on this matter  will now be discussed. 
3.3. Changes in the Eeiency of Energy Utilization 
The flows of energy input in the  F R G  since 1950 are measured by means of 
index numbers (E), based on 1970 = 100. This is similar to the indexes of ne t  
volume of production (V) discussed earlier in Section 2. Division of the energy 
input by the  output (E/ V), both expressed as  index numbers, indicates whether 
the energy input per unit of output has increased, decreased, or remained sta- 
tionary over the  years. A set  of 1970 = 100 based indexes for production (V), 
energy input (E), and the energy coefficient (E/ V) is presented in IlASA com- 
puter printouts, which are available from the  author on request. 
In the  long period from 1950 to  1983, the  growth in final energy input for 
to ta l  manufacturing has continuously lagged behind the growth in output. Over 
the  same period, the energy used per  unit  of value added has continuously 
decreased; this is shown in Figures 4-11, which were compiled from Tables 8 
and 11 and the  computer printouts mentioned above. These show clearly tha t  
energy savings, or  increased efficiency in the  use of energy. did not s t a r t  in 
1973 when the  price of energy sky-rocketed. Instead, energy savings by the 
manuracturing sector have followed a long-term trend: they were already evi- 
dent  in the  1950s (though this may not have been a very normal period); they 
continued in the  1960s. despite the fact that  energy prices on the  whole were 
Rgure 4. FRG Total Manufacturing. The Growth of Output. Final Energy 
and t h e  Energy Coefficient since 1950. 
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Rgure 5. FRG Iron and Steel Producing Industries. The Growth of Output, Final 
Energy Input and the  Energy Coefficient s ince  1950. 
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rigure 6. FRG Steel Foundries (castings). The Growth of Output, Final energy 
Input and the Energy Coefficient since 1950. 
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Figure 7. FRG Stone, Sand and Clay (incl. Cement) Industries. The Growth of 
Output, Final Energy Input and the Energy CoeEcient since 1950. 
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Rgure 8. FP,G Mineral Oil Refining. The Growth of Output, Energy Input and the 
Energy Coefficient since 1950. 
Figure 9. F'RG Cellulose, Pulp and (raw) Paper Industry. The Growth of Output, 
Final Energy Input and the Energy Coefficient since 1950. 
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Rgure 10. FRG Machinery Construction. The Growth of Output, Final Energy 
Input and the Energy Coefficient since 1950. 
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Rgure 11. FRG Motor Vehicles Industry (incl. Airplanes). 
Final Energy Input and the  Energy Coefficient since 1950. 
The Growth of Output. 
not increasing a t  that  time; they persisted through t h e  1970s when energy 
prices w e  rising sharply, and they continued in the early 1980s when this was 
no longer the  case. 
What brought about this long-term trend of technological improvements in 
the  efficiency of fuel utilization? While we are  not in  a position to make any 
quantitative assessments, we can point t o  a few factors tha t  may have been 
instrumental. f i r s t  of all it must  be borne in mind, and this goes for all indus- 
tries, across the board, that  there is a perpetual process of retiring old and usu- 
ally fuel-inefficient equipment. In times of recession the equipment may not 
get  replaced a t  all; an important example of this is t he  steel industry in the 
United States in the 1970s. But if and when the  retired equipment is replaced 
or  new equipment is installed, this will be more upto-date and almost certainly 
more fuel efficient. Some of the  improvement in the  efficiency of fuel utiliza- 
tion in the manufacturing sector,  both total and by individual industries, was 
also due to inteffuel substitution, namely the replacement of coal by oil and 
gas, and the substitution of fossil fuels by electricity. In addition, there are 
special factors to  be considered for each individual industry. For iron and steel 
this involved changes in t h e  mix of input materials, from ores to  the  less 
energy-demanding recirculation of scrap  metal, a switch that  is most practical 
in  times of low demand for the  industry's output. Then there  was the  introduc- 
tion of new technology during the  1970s. which led to massive savings of energy 
by aluminum smelting and paper manufacturing; both of these industries are 
energy intensive, but they play a relatively minor part  in the  industrial struc- 
ture  of the FRG. The growth of value added, final energy demand, and the 
energy coefficient is shown for total manufacturing and for selected industries 
in Flgures 4-11. 
3.4. summary 
The analysis presented above has  shown that  the  major reason why energy 
requirements failed to grow as much  a s  value added for the manufacturing sec- 
tor  as a whole is the pattern of s t ructural  changes in FRG industry. In other 
words, the slow growth of major, energy-intensive industries t ha t  a re  low in 
value added coincided w i t h  t h e  fast growth of industries t ha t  a r e  high in value 
added and relatively modest in energy requirements. A contributing factor was 
the  general decline in energy input required per unit  of value added across 
almost all manufacturing industries, due to the more efficient utilization of 
fuel. This is also a long-term trend, caused by the continuous ret i rement  of 
older, less fuel-efficient equipment a s  well as  interfuel substitution. There 
remains the question of why the  decrease in the energy demand for manufac- 
turing should have influenced the so-called "breaking of the energy coefficient." 
Here it seems that  the long-term trends in energy "savings" caused by struc- 
tural  changes in industrial profile and technological efficiency improvements 
were accelerated by t h e  slowdown in investments for infrastructure, particu- 
larly public-sector construction, tha t  s tar ted in the late  1960s and  early 1970s. 
After the oil price explosions of 1973 and 1979 came recessions tha t  further 
slowed down the energy-intensive industries, particularly most of t h e  primary 
metals, stone and earth, and basic chemicals. With the  output  of these indus- 
tries falling below 1970 levels, and the  output of industries t ha t  a r e  lighter in 
energy requirements and higher in value added rising, the gap  began to widen 
between the energy input and value added output for manufacturing a s  a whole. 
4. THE CHANGING SI'RUCI'URE OF MANUFACITJRING CAPITAL SrOCK 
4.1. Sources and Definitions 
The values of the manufacturing sector's capital stock a t  constant 1970 
prices used here are estimates of the  gross value of plant and equipment 
( ~ a g e u e r m o g e n )  prepared by the statistical authorities of the FRG. The inclu- 
sion of plant construction means that  the assets or capital stock have by 
definition a longer life than if the estimates related to equipment only. For this 
reason, the time lag between manufacturing output, energy input, and capital 
stock tends to be somewhat distorted. On the other hand. the distortions would 
be more serious i f  the capital stock related to equipment alone. This is because 
certain structures, e.g. blast furnaces, are included in some countries as plant 
(USA) and in other countries as equipment (USSR). For this reason it may be 
preferable to use total capital-stock data including both plant and equipment, 
so as to facilitate international comparisons. The disaggregation into 20 indus- 
try groups was made by the German statistical authorities to agree with the 
classification used for the net volume of production, which in turn follows the 
groupings of the  Energy Balances discussed in Sections 2 and 3 above. 
4.2. The Manufacturing Sector as a Whole 
The value in constant 1970 prices of the entire capital stock used in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole rose uninterruptedly from D-Mark 100.1 billion 
in 1950 to 213.7 billion in 1960 and 417.9 billion in 1970. In the 1950s capital 
stock more than doubled and in the 1960s it nearly doubled.. Both decades were 
characterized by high growth of manufacturing output. 
During t h e  1970s. the growth rates of both GDP and manufacturing output 
slowed down, and the growth of the capital stock for total manufacturing, 
though nearly uninterrupted throughout the decade, amounted to no more 
than 37% overall. This slow growth of capital stock was consistent with the slow- 
down of investments as a function of the slackening growth of GDP. 
4.3. Selected Industries 
The relative decline of some of the slow-growth industries discussed earlier 
in Section 2 was reflected to some extent in the changing structure of capital 
stock (see Table 13). Thus the share in total capital stock of the iron and steel 
industries, after a small increase from 7.42% in 1950 to 8.73% in 1960, con- 
sistently fell thereafter to a low of 6.60% in 1980. The same was true for steel 
foundries and steel drawing, whose shares dropped. respectively, from 2.23 and 
1.16% in 1950 to 1.04 and 0.82% in 1990. Similarly, the constructional steel 
industry, which includes shipbuildmg and locomotives. experienced a long-term 
decrease in its share of total manufacturing capital stock from 2.84% in 1950 to 
2.05% in 1980. Nonferrous metals saw i ts  share in total manufacturing stock 
drop from 3.64% in 1950 to a low of 2.01% in 1970. Between 1971 and 1975/76 
there was an  increase, seemingly reflecting the investment in the aluminum 
industry. But with plans for the further expansion of aluminum smelters in 
limbo, the share of capital stock for nonferrous metals has been constant since 
1975. 
The relative decline in the capital stock of these energy-intensive, slow- 
growth industries, particularly during the 1970s seems to have been due to the 
Fact that  little or no new capital stock was introduced. coinciding with the shut- 
down of older, obsolete equipment. This process of disinvestment rather than 
Table 13. The changing structure of capital stock in the manufacturing sector of the FRC, 1950-80; percentage shares. 
1. Slow Orowih hadwtnrs  
Iron and .tee1 production 
Steel foundries 
Steel drawlng 
Nonferrous metal. 
Constructional steel, 
shipbuilding 
Fabricated metal 
products, hardware 
Nonelectrical 
maohinery 
Stone. n n d ,  clay 
Lumber and mawrnlll~ 
Cellulome, pulp, paper 
Textile., excl. clothing 
Food, beverager, and 
tobacco 
Miac. conaurner good. 
2. Fhst Qrowth hdwt r i r s  
Electric and 
electronic mach. 
Chemlcala 
Synthetic and plastic 
8OOds 
Fine ceramics and glass 
3. Fbrmw h i  Qrowih h d u s M ~ s  
Mineral oil refining 3.02 2.72 2.88 2.82 2.82 2.83 2.84 
Motor vehiclea 5.03 8.01 8.88 9.15 9.23 8.28 8.28 
Rubber and asbestos 1.38 1.18 I .  1.38 1.43 1.44 1.44 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Total manufacturing 
capital stock: 
in 10' DM at  1870 pricea 100.1 213.7 417.8 444.8 488.8 488.8 608.3 
Source: hutache8 ht l tut  fflr Rr#.ehqllqfnnahung (DIW); r e  yea~by-yew data in IIASA computer prlntouU. 
new investment appears t o  have been one of the major reasons for the 
increased efficiency in fuel utilization that  followed the first oil price explosion. 
Other so-called slow-growth industries whose shares in total manufacturing 
output receded markedly over the 30-year observation period maintained a 
fairly unchanged share in total manufacturing capital s tock  This is true, for 
example, of the  textile industry, whose fairly high share remained more or less 
a t  7% of total manufacturing capital stock between 1950 and 1980. Likewise, 
nonelectrical machinery construction, which in contrast to  electric and elec- 
tronic equipment was only a slow-growth industry, maintained a fairly stable 
share of 9% in total manufacturing capital stock throughout the  period 
1950-1980. The food, beverage. and tobacco group saw its share in total capital 
manufacturing stock f a l l  slightly from a high of 13.8% in 1950 to  12.30% in 1960, 
and after a few minor ups and downs in the 1970s it stood a t  11.30% in 1980. 
It may be assumed tha t ,  despite underutilization of capital stock, some of 
the relatively declining industries such as food, textiles, and nonelectrical 
machinery construction, which work with older and less sophisticated technolo- 
gies, saw no need to shut  down their old equipment. 
The fast growth in the production of the chemical industry coincided with a 
decrease of the industry's share in total manufacturing stock from 21.52% in 
1950 to 15.48% in 1960. This decrease may have been due to noneconomic cir- 
cumstances. Throughout the  1960s and 1970s the share of chemicals in total 
manufacturing capital stock oscillated around 1552 but never again reached the 
high of 1950. This lack of growth in the share of capital stock contrasts with the 
rapid growth in the  industry's output. Unfortunately, the available data on out- 
put, energy input, and capital stock relating to chemicals a re  not suEciently 
detailed to make a meaningful analysis. Based on selected output and energy 
consumption data we can only surmise tha t  the reason for the relatively slow 
growth of the manufacturing capital stock for chemicals as compared to the 
very fast growth in  the industry's output may be the structural shift within 
total chemicals production from energy- and capital-intensive basic and inter- 
mediate goods to final consumer goods that  require less of both these factors. 
As regards mineral oil refining, its share in capital stock dropped from 
3.02% in 1950 to  2.72% in 1960, which was somewhat similar to  what happened 
with the chemicals industry. After 1960 the share kept rising again to a high of 
2.95% reached in 1968. Thereafter i t  decreased, reaching a low of 2.60% in 1960. 
This may indicate tha t  mineral oil refining has ceased to be a fast-growing 
industry. 
Now to  the growth industries par ezcel lence ,  electric and electronic equip- 
ment,  and motor vehicles (including aircraft). The post-World War 11 automobile 
industry got its lift with the "Wirtschqftsulundef'; so &d the electric and elec- 
tronic equipment industry. whose continued expansion is based on technologi- 
cal innovation. The growth of both these industries was reflected in the rapid 
growth of their capital stock. The share of motor vehicles (including automo- 
biles, aircraft, and space ships) in total manufacturing capital stock moved 
from 5.03% in 1950 to 6.61% in 1960, and further upward to 10.07% in 1980. A 
similar process occurred for electric and electronic equipment, where the 
share increased from 6.14% in 1950 to 7.92% in 1960 and then without interrup- 
tion to 10.78% in 1980. 
Finally, the processing of plastics and synthetics into manufactured goods 
is a comparatively young and fast-growth industry, based on technical innova- 
tion. Its share in total manufacturing capital stock rose from 0.25% in 1950 to 
2.14% in 1980. 
This ends our admittedly very broad survey of the changes in the capital 
structure of the manufacturing sector of the FRC. For a look at a few other 
industries not explicitly mentioned above and for year-by-year data. the reader 
is referred to Table 13. 
